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Abstract 
 
The rapid recent expansion of copyright law worldwide has sparked efforts to defend 
the ‘public domain’ of non-propertized information, often on the ground that an 
expansive public domain is a condition of a ‘free culture. Yet questions remain about 
why the public domain is worth defending, what exactly a free culture is, and what 
role (if any) authors' rights might play in relation to it. From the standard liberal 
perspective shared by many critics of copyright expansionism, the protection of 
individual expression by means of marketable property rights in authors’ works serves 
as an engine of progress towards a fully competitive ‘marketplace of ideas’ – though 
only if balanced by an extensive public domain from which users may draw in the 
exercise of their own expressivity. This article shows that a significantly different, and 
arguably richer, conception of what a free culture is and how authors' rights underpin 
it emerges from a direct engagement with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For 
Kant, progress towards a fully emancipated (i.e. a ‘mature’ or ‘enlightened’) culture 
can only be achieved through the critical intellectual activity that public 
communication demands: individual expressive freedom is only a condition, not 
constitutive, of this ‘freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters’. The 
main thesis defended in this article is that when Kant's writings on publicity (critical 
public debate) are read in relation to his writings on the legal organization of 
publishing, a necessary connection emerges between authors' rights – as distinct from 
copyrights – and what Jürgen Habermas and others have named the public sphere. I 
conclude that it is the public sphere, and not the public domain as such, that should 
serve as the key reference point in any evaluation of copyright law’s role in relation to 
the possibility of a free culture.  
 
Keywords: Kant; authors’ rights; copyright; intellectual property; public reason; 
public sphere; Habermas. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As currently institutionalized, copyrights are property rights that subsist in the ‘works’ 
of authors, where works are legally defined to include all the intellectual products 
marketed by the cultural and information industries as publications, broadcast and 
online content, and software. Copyrights have two key features that they share with 
other species of property right: they are alienable, and they equip their holders with the 
power to exclude all others from the (intangible) objects in which they subsist. The 
power of exclusion is by no means absolute: for example, copyrights are limited in 
duration and in extent,1 and copyright law recognizes would-be users of the works that 
                                                 
1
 A copyright in a work in fact comprises an array of property rights to control reproduction of the 
work, various forms of distribution of copies of the work (paradigmatically by sale), and all kinds of 
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it protects as having privileges to use them for certain purposes without incurring 
liability.2 Nonetheless, the subsistence of a copyright in a work entitles the holder of 
the copyright to control (i.e. veto or licence, in return for royalties) certain uses of the 
work by anyone else within the jurisdiction, and indeed beyond.3  
 
In common law jurisdictions, the copyright system has on the whole tended to be 
justified in liberal-utilitarian terms, more particularly in terms of its contribution to 
achieving an efficient allocation of society’s scarce resources. According to the 
standard economic analysis, an efficient regime of copyright protection is a ‘balanced’ 
regime that limits the unpaid use of ‘information goods’ just enough to ensure that 
incentives are available to motivate their production, but no more. In the past couple 
of decades this paradigm for understanding copyright law has been challenged by 
what Mark Lemley has described as an ‘absolute protection’ or ‘full value’ view of 
intellectual property (IP),4 informed by neoclassical property rights theory and 
defined by a strong commitment to the idea that private property rights should ideally 
extend to every valued use of information goods, such that users would be required by 
law to pay the owner’s price for any such use except in atypical instances of 
unavoidable market failure. Arguably, the expansion that copyright law has 
undergone at national, regional and international levels over the last two decades in 
particular has been legitimated by the rise to ascendancy of this way of thinking, the 
underlying assumption of which is that cultural development and the advancement of 
knowledge are best secured by privatizing the ‘raw materials’ of these processes. 
 
This assumption is contested in a large literature (and an associated political 
movement) that has emerged by way of a backlash against IP expansionism and the 
hegemony of its justificatory theory. Here the category of the ‘public domain’ plays a 
key role. In ordinary parlance, information is said to be in the public domain when it 
is publicly available, i.e. not secret. In the context of the contemporary resistance to IP 
expansionism, however, it generally refers to “information resources that are 
unencumbered by intellectual property rights”5 as well as being publicly available in 
that sense. Defenders of this public domain argue strenuously against its colonization 
                                                                                                                                            
public communication (including public performance and electronic transmission) of the work. (See 
e.g. the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (UK), c.48 ss.17-21 (1988); US Copyright Act, 17 USC 
§106 (1976).) However a copyright is not an ownership right (compare Honoré’s list of the ‘standard 
incidents’ of full ownership: Anthony M. Honoré, “Ownership” in Anthony G. Guest (ed.) Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961). In Hohfeldian terms, it could be said that the 
‘bundle of rights’ comprised in a copyright is relatively thin. 
2
 For example, Chapter III of the UK’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 exempts ‘fair’ use of 
a work in some circumstances for certain approved purposes – non-commercial research and private 
study, criticism or review, and news reporting – and includes a lengthy catalogue of more narrowly 
defined exemptions. 
3
 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works sets out minimum standards 
of copyright protection that must be available in every signatory state to nationals of other signatory 
states. Further, Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – 
one of the agreements administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) – puts WTO members 
under an obligation to comply with the Berne Convention, and adds a substantial number of additional 
obligations that go beyond those imposed by membership of the Berne Union. 
4
 Mark A. Lemley, “Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding” Texas Law Review 83 (2005) 
pp.1031-1075 (criticizing the absolute protection view). 
5
 Pamela Samuelson, “Challenges in Mapping the Public Domain” in L. Guilbault and P. B. Hugenholtz 
(eds.) The Future of the Public Domain: Identifying the Commons in Information Law (Kluwer: Alphen 
aan den Rijn, 2006), pp.7-25. 
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via the ‘second enclosure movement’6 that they claim is represented by IP 
expansionism and legitimated by neoclassical economic theory. They argue for a 
positive re-valuation of non-propertized ‘information resources’: overcoming the 
negative representation of the public domain as a kind of wasteland, “a sad jumble of 
things that don’t deserve to be protected by intellectual property laws or … a 
netherworld where old information goes to die,”7 as one sympathetic commentator has 
put it. There is now a well-established tendency to conceptualize the public domain as 
a kind of cultural ‘environment,’8 which in turn has yielded calls for strategies of 
‘environmental preservation’ analogous to those around which the environmental 
movement took shape in the 1970s. Yet these tendencies are frequently underpinned 
by concerns to emphasize the economic value of the public domain and the 
inefficiencies that can result from privatizing its contents, and this tends only to 
reinforce liberal-utilitarianism’s hegemony as the privileged lens through which to 
view copyright law and the fields that it affects.9 So while it is easy to be sympathetic 
towards the general ambition underlying these arguments, the arguments themselves 
have not so far been premised on a particularly rich understanding of what ‘culture’ 
is, what its social dynamics are, and what exactly, therefore, is threatened by IP 
expansionism in general and copyright expansionism in particular. This article forms 
part of an ongoing project to address these questions.  
 
One promising starting point from which to begin to address them is the idea that an 
author is a kind of speaker (i.e. one who creates works with a view to communicating 
with a public), that ‘culture’ is the realm in which dialogue between speakers occurs, 
and that copyright law rightly forms part of the legal framework that facilitates this 
dialogue. Theorists of copyright law who adopt this starting point frequently assume 
that authorial rights (as well as limits on these rights) are legitimated by a more 
general individual right to freedom of expression, with copyright law – as the United 
States Supreme Court famously put it in 1985 – serving as the ‘engine’ of free 
expression by establishing marketable rights in expressive products.10 On this 
standard liberal view, culture is envisioned on the model of a ‘marketplace of ideas’, 
underpinned by an actual market in authors’ works, which in turn is underpinned in 
various ways by law. In so far as copyright law helps to produce the conditions in 
which competitive markets in authors’ works can flourish, it is said to be consistent 
with freedom of expression.11 Its recent expansionary tendencies – which have made 
copyrights ever less like the limited property rights they were originally designed to 
be, and ever more like rights of absolute dominion over intellectual creations – have 
yielded a standard diagnosis of how copyright law can threaten freedom of 
                                                 
6
 James Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain” Law & 
Contemporary Problems 66 (2003) pp.33-74. 
7
 Samuelson, “Challenges in Mapping the Public Domain,” p.7. 
8
 See e.g. the papers published as a special issue of Law and Contemporary Problems on the theme of 
‘Cultural Environmentalism @ 10’ (2007, Vol. 70, No. 2), and James Boyle, The Public Domain: 
Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2008). 
9
 On this see Anne Barron, “Copyright Infringement, ‘Free-Riding’ and the Lifeworld” in Lionel 
Bently, Jennifer Davis and Jane Ginsburg (eds.) Copyright and Piracy: An Interdisciplinary Critique 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.93-127.  
10
 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (“By establishing a 
marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas” (ibid. p. 558)). 
11
 For an exemplary study in this vein, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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expression. Given the oligopolistic structure of markets for cultural commodities, 
bloated copyrights produce a ‘permission culture’ that chills expression (since 
permission to use copyright material as raw material for follow-on creativity “is not 
often granted to the critical or independent”).12 The negative liberty of individuals is 
thereby endangered; some have argued that space for the self-cultivation of each 
individual’s potentialities (‘autonomy’ as understood within the tradition that includes 
J.S. Mill and Joseph Raz) is also restricted.13 Consequently, the benefits that accrue to 
society as a whole from the clamour of competing claims and perspectives – a 
diversity of opinions and forms of creativity, information which is reliable because 
tested in the heat of public debate, the dissemination of knowledge, a more effective 
democracy – are diminished. From the perspective of this liberalism, a free culture 
emerges from the freedoms of individuals to say what they choose to say and 
experience what others choose to say, unhindered in either dimension by intellectual 
property rights unless aggregate welfare (or on the Razian view, liberal-democratic 
culture as a ‘common good’)14 is thereby advanced.  
 
My claim in this article is that a significantly different, and arguably richer, 
conception of what a free culture entails and how the rights of authors relate to it 
emerges from a direct engagement with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.15 The 
immediate justification for turning to Kant in this context is that he dealt very directly 
with the issue of authors’ rights – first in an essay published in 178516 (hereinafter 
‘1785 Essay’) and again briefly in a section – entitled “What is a Book” – of his late 
work of political philosophy, Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals.17 Moreover, he 
theorized these rights as speech rights, and not as rights of property in works 
                                                 
12
 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down 
Culture and Control Creativity (New York: Penguin, 2004), p.10. 
13
 Yochai Benkler’s critique of copyright’s expansionary tendencies seems to proceed from a liberal 
perfectionism indebted to Joseph Raz and ultimately to J.S. Mill (see in particular his “Free as the Air 
to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain” (1999) 74 N.Y.U. 
L.Rev. 354 and “Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information and Law” 76 (2001) N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 23). For an accessible statement of Benkler’s position, see his The Wealth of Networks (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), esp. Ch. 5 (arguing that the ‘industrial’ organization 
of information production, underpinned by strong copyrights, enables the flow of information to 
individuals to be shaped by a few large corporations, limiting individuals’ capacities to ‘author their 
own lives’).  
14
 From the Razian perspective, a liberal-democratic culture is a common good because it not only 
serves the interests of individual rights-bearers but also advances the conditions under which all 
members of a society could achieve personal autonomy (see e.g. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). On the relationship between the utilitarian principle of 
aggregate utility and Raz’s conception of the common or general good, see generally Joseph Chan, 
“Raz on Liberal Rights and Common Goods” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15 (1995) pp.15-31.  
15
 Page references to all of Kant’s works cited in this article – except those collected in H. Reiss (ed.) 
Kant’s Political Writings (2nd ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) – include in 
parentheses references by volume:page number to the Prussian Academy edition of Kant’s works. 
References to the Critique of Pure Reason include in parentheses references to the pagination of the 
first and second editions, indicated by the letters ‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively. 
16
 Immanuel Kant, “On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books” (1785), in Mary J. 
Gregor (ed.) Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998) 
pp.29-35 (8:79-87). (References to the Essay are all to this translation.) 
17
 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), in Gregor (ed.), Immanuel Kant: Practical 
Philosophy, pp.353-603, at pp.437-438 (6:289-291).  (References to The Metaphysics of Morals are all 
to this translation.) 
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considered as crystallizations of their authors’ communications.18 The most well-
known of the arguments contained in these writings can be briefly outlined. Kant’s 
premise is that a book considered as a material object must be distinguished from a 
book considered as the vehicle for an activity of authorial speech. On the one hand, an 
author’s manuscript, and every printed copy of it, is an ordinary object of property 
attracting an ordinary right of property vested in whomever is legitimately in 
possession of the object. This right would include the right to use the object, to sell 
the object and indeed to copy the object. On the other hand, a published book 
(considered as the vehicle of its author’s speech) is also a communication from 
publisher to public in the name of the author. Hence it is also an action, and as such it 
has its existence in a person – the person of the author. For Kant, it follows that 
unauthorized publication of copies of the author’s text – though not unauthorized 
reproduction as such – is wrongful. By selling copies of an author’s text to the public, 
the unauthorized publisher is not just dealing with commodities – printed books – in 
his own name, but is disseminating an author’s speech, thus compelling the author to 
speak against his will,19 to acknowledge the book as his own and be responsible for 
it.20 Actions “belong exclusively to the person of the author, and the author has in 
them an inalienable right always himself to speak through anyone else, the right, that 
is, that no one may deliver the same speech to the public other than in his (the 
author’s) name”21 or deliver a fundamentally altered speech in his name.22 However if 
                                                 
18
 This has been contested, most influentially by Kant’s younger contemporary, Johann Fichte. In 1793, 
Fichte – citing Kant’s 1785 Essay in support – argued that an author has a “natural, inborn, and 
inalienable right of ownership” in his work (Johann G. Fichte “Proof of the Unlawfulness of 
Reprinting” (Berlinische Monatschrift (1793), pp. 443-482, p.461 and 472-3 (trans. Martha 
Woodmansee, in L. Bently & M. Kretschmer (eds.) Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), 
available at: www.copyrighthistory.org). An author’s book, Fichte argued, consists of three aspects. It 
has a physical aspect (the manuscript or printed book), and an ideal aspect which is in turn divisible 
into two: the ideas expressed by the author and the ‘form’ of the author’s expression of those ideas: 
“the way in which, the combination in which, the phrasing and wording in which they are presented” 
(ibid p. 447) Although ideas become the common property of all as soon as a book is published, the 
form in which they are expressed, Fichte argued, “remains forever … [the author’s] exclusive 
property” (ibid p. 451). Fichte claimed that this followed from Kant’s argument in the 1785 Essay that 
a book is a use of the author's faculties. That activity, according to Fichte, consists in giving form to 
thoughts, “so that it is through [the author] – and only in that particular form which he has defined for it 
– that the book is able to exist” (ibid p. 472). Fichte’s claim here appears to be that because each 
individual’s process of giving form to thoughts is unique to him- or herself, the resulting form is that 
person’s exclusive and inalienable property. Nothing in the 1785 Essay supports this claim. Moreover, 
it is not in accordance with Kant’s thinking, because it depends on an idea of self-actualization through 
ownership to which Kant did not adhere. Fichte here, as on many other questions, is closer to his 
intellectual successor Hegel than to his predecessor Kant (see further Allen Wood, Hegel’s Ethical 
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Ch. 4 and 5; Jay Lampert, “Locke, Fichte 
and Hegel on the Right to Property” in M. Baur and J. Russon (eds.) Hegel and the Tradition: Essays 
in Honour of H.S. Harris  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), pp.40-73; Alan Patten, Hegel’s 
Idea of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Ch. 5). 
19
 “The author and someone who owns a copy can both, with equal right, say of the same book, ‘it is 
my book,’ but in different senses. The former takes the book as writing or speech, the second merely as 
the mute instrument of delivering speech to him or the public, i.e. as a copy. This right of the author is, 
however, not a right to a thing, namely to the copy (for the owner can burn it before the author’s eyes), 
but an innate right in his own person, namely, to prevent another from having him speak to the public 
without his consent, which consent certainly cannot be presumed because he has already given it 
exclusively to someone else” (Kant, “On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books” 
p.35 (footnote to text at 8:87), emphasis added). 
20
 Ibid. p.33 (8:84). 
21
 Ibid. p.35 (8:86).  
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the work is indeed so altered that it would be wrong to attribute it to the author, it can 
rightfully be published in the modifier’s name.23  
 
These remarks on authors’ rights have not gone unnoticed by copyright lawyers. On 
the contrary, Kant’s 1785 Essay is often cited as inspiration for the theory – now 
institutionalized in international copyright law – that authors ought to have inalienable 
‘moral’ rights in relation to their works.24 These are enforceable legal rights which are 
‘moral’ in the sense that they concern authors’ non-pecuniary interests in relation to 
their works (such as the interest in being identified as author, and in ensuring that 
one’s works are published only in the form in which they were created); and they 
contrast with the economic rights (e.g. to control the reproduction and distribution of 
copies) which protect authors’ pecuniary interests in the commercial exploitation of 
their works. Yet moral rights in practice afford far less protection to authors than the 
theory would suggest, and transferable economic rights to the most commercially 
valuable works are more often than not held by corporate investors. And since it is 
economic rights which are the focus of concerns about copyright expansionism and its 
implications for the public domain, the formal recognition of a doctrine of moral 
rights has done little to allay these concerns.  
 
However, in the fairly recent past, there has been renewed scholarly interest in 
exploring not only the 1785 Essay, but also Kant’s better-known philosophical texts, 
for more comprehensive insights about how copyright law in general might be re-
thought so as to give more weight to the rights of ‘transformative’ authors – those 
who, in re-using authored material, also modify that material – and thereby also 
imbue the public domain of freely re-usable intellectual artefacts with a richer 
normative significance. Against the grain of Kant’s own writings, Leslie Kim Treiger-
Bar-Am has attempted to derive a right to what she calls ‘autonomy of expression’ 
from a conception of moral autonomy that she takes from Kant’s ethical theory. She 
argues that the 1785 Essay can be read as defining a structure of authorial rights to 
autonomy of expression, necessitated by the respect due to individual dignity, which 
in turn is grounded in a universal capacity for moral autonomy.25 From this structure 
                                                                                                                                            
22
 For Kant, this inalienable personal right only arises in relation to a particular class of thing: 
manuscripts or books incorporating writings. While the literary ‘action’ can always be distinguished 
from the printed book, in the work of visual art the idea or intellectual element cannot be separated 
from the material object, and for this reason Kant excludes paintings and sculptures from the category 
of works protected by a personal right to prevent the distribution of copies: a work of visual art, it 
would seem, is merely a thing (ibid. p.34 (8:85-6)). 
23
 Ibid. p.35 (8:86-7). 
24
 There are extensive literatures on the historical emergence of authors’ moral rights and on their 
conceptual relationship with authors’ economic rights (for an exemplary analysis, see Stig Strömholm, 
Le Droit Moral de l’Auteur (2 Vols.) (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söners Förlag, 1967)). It suffices 
for present purposes to say that, as currently understood, moral rights rest on a theorization of authors’ 
works as manifesting the author’s person, and hence as attracting a species of inalienable ‘personality’ 
right that is specific to authors (see further on the rise to global dominance of this theorization, Cyrill P. 
Rigamonti, “The Conceptual Transformation of Moral Rights” (2007) 55 Am. J. Comp. L. 67). It is not 
uncommon for proponents of this theorization to seek to support it by reference to Kant’s 1785 Essay 
(see e.g. Strömholm, Le Droit Moral de l’Auteur pp.184-95). The analysis of the Essay I propose here, 
however, suggests that these interpretations miss the point of Kant’s reflections on authors’ rights. 
25
 Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, “Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship” Cardozo 
Arts and Entertainment Law Journal (2008) pp.1059-1103. “The autonomy that affords the capacity to 
self-legislate is the ground of a rational being’s dignity…. Because we are autonomous, we deserve 
respect for our dignity…. Autonomy therefore grounds both [the unconditional and universal right to 
respect for] the dignity of autonomous beings and also their obligation to respect the dignity of others” 
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of authorial rights, she argues, it can be inferred that the transformative re-use of a 
first author’s work by a second author ought to attract the same rights (and the same 
correlative duties) as the first author’s expressive act. Abraham Drassinower too has 
invoked the 1785 Essay in the process of reaching similar conclusions regarding 
transformative authorship.26 However in contrast to Treiger-Bar-Am, Drassinower has 
tended to orient himself by reference to Kant’s philosophy of law, although he too at 
times seeks to account for the rights of authors in general in terms of the ‘respect’ 
owed to the ‘autonomy’ or ‘dignity’ of the individual:27 terms that derive from Kant’s 
ethical theory. In a series of thoughtful and important articles, Drassinower has for 
example drawn on the principle of equal external freedom that animates Kant’s legal 
theory to elaborate a conception of the public domain (of intellectual materials which 
may be freely used by others) as a necessary limit to the author’s right, generated by 
the internal logic of that right itself. His central theme has been that a justifiable 
copyright regime must be one that secures equal expressive freedom as between 
authors and users of copyright material. 
 
Helpful though these contributions have been in rescuing the 1785 Essay from relative 
obscurity and making it relevant to contemporary debates – including in particular 
those sparked by the rise of Web 2.0 and the ubiquity of (re)user-generated digital 
‘content’ – they do not in the end depart from the standard liberal model of expressive 
freedom that was outlined above. Effectively, they assimilate Kant’s conception of 
freedom to the idea(s) of freedom embedded in that model, thereby continuing the 
habit – most recently exemplified in the IP context by Robert P. Merges’s Justifying 
Intellectual Property28 – of representing Kant as the originator of a liberal 
individualism now widely associated with figures such as Ronald Dworkin and John 
Rawls. In what follows, I contest this representation on the ground that it is 
inconsistent with both the letter of Kant’s texts and the spirit animating his 
philosophical system. In particular, it involves conflating conceptions and forms of 
                                                                                                                                            
(ibid. pp.1099-1100). 
26
 Abraham Drassinower “A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law” 
Canadian Journal of Law and & Jurisprudence 16 (2003) pp.3-21; “Taking User Rights Seriously” in 
Michael Geist, ed., In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law, (Toronto:  Irwin 
Law, 2005), pp.462-479; “Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity of Copyright vis-à-vis 
Patent and Trade-Mark” Michigan State Law Review 1 (2008) pp.199-232; “From Distribution to 
Dialogue: Remarks on the Concept of Balance in Copyright Law” 34(4) (2009) Journal of Corporation 
Law pp. 991-1007; “Copyright Infringement as Compelled Speech” (2011) (draft article on file with 
the author).  
27
 See especially “A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy,” “Taking User Rights 
Seriously” and “Copyright Infringement as Compelled Speech.” 
28
 Robert P. Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2011). Proclaiming a loss of faith in the utilitarianism that has hitherto guided his writings on IP, 
Merges here seeks to incorporate a reading of Kant’s theory of property (together with those of Locke 
and Rawls) into “a liberal theory of intellectual property law” (ibid. p.13) that he hopes will equip the 
field with a more credible normative foundation. Kant is important to this project because, for Merges, 
“[h]is thought upends amorphous concepts of collective interest and utilitarian balancing, replacing 
them with [an] … idea of personal autonomy” (ibid. p.17) as “the ability to steer oneself according to 
one’s own plan and design” (ibid. p.18). Taking Kant seriously thus results in “a more clear-headed 
focus” (ibid.) on intellectual property as an individual – though alienable (ibid. p.81) – right which 
takes precedence over “third-party interests” (ibid. p.17). From this interpretation of the centrality of 
personal autonomy and individual rights to Kant’s philosophy – an interpretation broadly congruent 
with that of Treiger-Bar-Am and Drassinower – Merges is able to reach a diametrically opposed 
conclusion: “An infusion of Kant promises to help correct the recent and intense emphasis on the rights 
of users and consumers of IP” (ibid., emphasis added).  
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freedom that for Kant were quite distinct, albeit closely related – agency and 
autonomy; moral autonomy and intellectual autonomy; expressive freedom and 
communicative freedom; individual liberty and collective emancipation. I argue that a 
full appreciation of the significance for copyright law of the1785 Essay requires that 
these distinctions be kept firmly in mind, which in turn requires that the Essay be read 
in relation to Kant’s philosophical project as a whole, but in particular his vindication 
of “the freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters.”29 Drawing 
especially on Onora O’Neill’s interpretation of the various writings in which Kant 
explains the basis and significance of this freedom,30 I argue that what he envisages 
here is a principled freedom – a freedom to engage in what O’Neill has called 
‘tolerant’ communication. On one hand, ‘toleration’ names a particular attitude 
toward – indeed a practice in relation to – the communications of other persons: it is a 
response to communication31 which involves at the very least a recognition on the 
part of the addressee that she is addressed by another’s communication. On the other 
hand, toleration also names the act of communicating itself in so far as it aspires 
towards what Kant called ‘maturity’ – that is, in so far as it aims to be critical and 
reflective in relation to what we would now call dominant worldviews, hegemonic 
ideologies, homogenized cultures, embedded traditions or established forms of 
expertise – while also being open to the mature perspectives of others. To 
communicate in this spirit of toleration is to participate in a communication 
community which is engaged in a collective project: that of advancing towards a fully 
mature, or truly emancipated, culture. It is the possibility of this community, I argue, 
that is truly at stake in contemporary resistances to copyright expansionism. 
Rethinking authors’ rights as a structure of equal and reciprocal freedoms for 
individual authors and their addressees is only one aspect of what a Kantian approach 
to copyright law demands. More broadly, Kant’s philosophy calls for an interrogation 
of how copyright law and the practices it underpins relate to that process of collective 
emancipation which is enabled by tolerant communicative interactions. 
 
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 1 presents an analysis of the 
understanding of freedom contained in Kant’s practical philosophy. In 1.1 the core 
elements of Kant’s ethical theory – and in particular his understanding of (moral) 
autonomy – are briefly introduced. However the bulk of this section (1.2) is devoted 
to Kant’s legal theory (in particular his Doctrine of Right), because it is of more direct 
relevance to the interpretation of the 1785 Essay on authors’ rights. Having noted the 
centrality to this theory of the idea of progress towards a just political order, and the 
position Kant assigns to ‘publicity’ (open public debate) as the motor of this progress, 
I move in Section 2 to an analysis of the meaning and significance, for Kant, of free 
public criticism more generally. In Section 3, I consider the 1785 Essay against the 
backdrop formed by Kant’s critical philosophy as a whole – but in particular the 
Doctrine of Right and his conception of public reason – with a view to uncovering the 
systematic connections uniting all of these dimensions of his thought. Once these 
connections are appreciated, it will be apparent that Kant’s philosophical system 
yields a rich and complex picture of the significance of authors’ rights; and, as I argue 
                                                 
29
 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” (1784) [hereinafter “What 
is Enlightenment?”] in Gregor (ed.) Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy pp.17-22 (8:35-8:42), p.18. 
(All references to “What is Enlightenment?” are to this translation.) 
30
 Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
31
 Ibid. p.32 
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in Section 4, can inspire a more radical rethinking of copyright law’s role in relation 
to communicative freedom than has thus far been imagined. 
 
 
1 Kant’s Understanding of Practical Freedom  
 
1.1 Freedom as Autonomy: Kant’s Ethical Theory 
 
The idea of autonomy occupies a central place in contemporary liberal thought.32 As 
we shall see, it is also central to Kant’s philosophy – but it is a mistake to assume that 
‘it’ is the same idea of autonomy. When contemporary liberals refer to autonomy, 
they generally have in mind the vision of positive freedom set out by John Stuart Mill 
in his classic essay On Liberty:33 personal autonomy as the free development of 
‘individuality’ through the self-cultivation of one’s natural potentialities. Autonomy 
in this sense presupposes a private domain in which to make one’s own choices and 
form one’s own life-plans free of interference from others except to the extent that 
those plans prejudice the legitimate interests of other individuals.34 More particularly, 
it involves turning one’s wants and inclinations into expressions of one’s own nature, 
as developed by sustained activities of self-formation and self-government. This 
conception of autonomy is very different from – and in many ways at odds with – 
Kant’s account of moral autonomy as the submission of subjectively experienced 
wants and inclinations to the jurisdiction of an objectively valid moral law.35 Involved 
in his account is a characterization of the human capacity to will as manifesting itself 
in two ways. As Willkür, the will can be considered as a kind of legislative and 
executive authority, determining our rules of action and implementing them through 
action; as Wille, it can be regarded as a kind of constitutional authority, testing our 
ordinary rules of action against the supreme moral law ordained by pure reason. In 
ordinary practical reasoning, the rules legislated by Willkür have a hypothetical form: 
‘if I want x, I ought to do y’. Viewed from a Kantian perspective, Millian autonomy 
engages only Willkür, albeit in a particularly refined way: it presupposes a process of 
‘intelligent self-mastery’, through which we decide between our wants with a view to 
satisfying those that will realize our potentialities most completely. For Kant, 
however, action which is conditioned in any way by wants or ‘inclinations’ is not 
autonomous, but heteronomous. Certainly, the will’s process of legislating and 
executing ordinary rules of action exhibits a kind of freedom – the freedom to choose 
which of our wants to pursue and how to pursue them. But action governed by such 
rules is not completely self-determined, because the rules themselves are dictated in 
                                                 
32
 Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991). For critical reflections, see John Christman and Joel Anderson, Autonomy and the Challenges to 
Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Katrin Flikschuh, Freedom: 
Contemporary Liberal Perspectives (Cambridge: Polity Press 2007). 
33
 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859) (London: Penguin, 1974), esp. Ch. III. 
34
 Treiger-Bar-Am’s notion of ‘autonomy of authorial expression’ is clearly informed by this liberal 
conception of autonomy: see her “Kant on Copyright” pp.1070-1; 1075-6 1082-4; 1093-99. So too is 
the conception of the creative individual’s personal autonomy invoked by Robert Merges in his 
Justifying Intellectual Property: see ibid. pp.70-83. The fundamental problem with these analyses is 
that they proceed from the erroneous assumption that this conception of autonomy is also Kant’s. 
35
 The key texts in which the elements of Kant’s moral theory are presented are: Groundwork for the 
Metaphysics of Morals (1785), in Gregor (ed.) Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, pp.41-108 
(4:385-4:463); Critique of Practical Reason (1788), in Gregor (ed.) Immanuel Kant: Practical 
Philosophy pp.137-271 (5:1-5:163); and Part II of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), in Gregor (ed.) 
Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy pp.507-603 (6:373-6:493). 
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part by something merely given: the object of a want. It follows that what ultimately 
causes one’s action here is this object – or, broadly, ‘nature.’ The will takes as given a 
naturally occurring inclination and decides only on the means of its fulfilment.  
 
Nonetheless, the limited form of freedom involved with these operations of Willkür 
necessarily, for Kant, presupposes a still higher form of freedom, whereby action is 
determined by reason alone. Kant calls this higher form of freedom free will, or 
‘autonomy’, and argues that it is engaged when Wille tests our rules of action for their 
moral validity. Wille’s ‘pure’ use of practical reason involves transcending our 
empirically given wants and deciding what we ought to do from the viewpoint of pure 
reason; and it is only when we act according to reason that we are truly autonomous. 
The first formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative captures what this entails: 
Wille mandates that in any action situation, our rules of action be universalizable as 
laws that any rational being could adopt to govern their actions.36 In observing this 
‘constitutional’ principle, we disregard any motive for action that could only be 
attributable to our particular inclinations, and realize the capacity of the human will to 
be truly autonomous. Kant took the view that every human being must be regarded as 
having the capacity for freedom in this sense. Hence the second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative requires respect for the rational autonomy (or ‘dignity’) 
inhering in every human being: ‘act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, always as an end and never as a means only.’37 
To treat a person as an end and never simply as a means to one’s ends is to treat that 
person as a being who could rationally endorse the reasons underlying one’s actions.  
 
1.2 Freedom as Agency: Kant’s Legal Theory 
 
Kant himself does not base authors’ rights – or rights generally – directly on the idea 
of moral autonomy. Rather, he elaborates a distinct philosophy of law, the Doctrine of 
Right (the Rechtslehre, which comprises Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals) 
precisely in order to deal with the contradiction between the idea of self-determination 
in accordance with a universal moral law, and the idea of Right as that set of universal 
moral norms which may be enforced: a right, after all, is “an authorisation to use 
coercion”38 against another. It is Kant’s Universal Principle of Right, not his 
Categorical Imperative, which provides the moral justification for this use of force. 
The need for a distinct principle authorising coercion arises from the inevitability of 
conflict between human beings in a context of finitude: a spatially limited planet, 
limited resources, and (consequently) human competition for the means of survival in 
a shared world. The concept of Right emerges from the interplay of these unavoidable 
empirical conditions with the (moral) principles according to which relations between 
persons should be formed. 
 
Both Kant’s ethical theory and his theory of Right are organized around the idea of 
freedom in conformity with law (and so are united as distinct parts of his overarching 
moral philosophy), but in different senses: they concern internal and external freedom 
respectively. Internal freedom depends on how one is motivated to act; external 
freedom depends on whether, in acting, one is impeded by the actions of other 
                                                 
36
 See e.g. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Gregor (ed.) Immanuel Kant: Practical 
Philosophy p.73 (4:421). (References to the Groundwork are all to this translation.) 
37
 Ibid. p.80 (4:429). 
38
 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals p.389 (6:232). 
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persons.39 If the Categorical Imperative imposes a duty on me to universalize my 
subjective reasons for acting – to render what I will compatible with what anyone else 
could rationally will – the Universal Principle of Right (UPR) requires that my 
actions be able to “coexist with everyone’s freedom [of action] in accordance with a 
universal law.”40 According to this principle, then, freedom of action is morally 
limited by reference to what is right, and the rightfulness of any individual’s action 
hinges on its implications for others’ freedom.41 From this principle, Kant claims to 
derive an entire system of rights (otherwise put, a system of reciprocal and coercible 
limits on action) which is morally required to reconcile conflicts between persons’ 
freedoms.  
 
‘Action’ here presupposes choice – the choice of which ends to pursue and which 
means to adopt in pursuit of them.42 One person’s action can interfere with another’s 
freedom of action either by depriving the other of the means for pursuing his or her 
ends, or by instrumentalizing those means towards ends not chosen by that other.43 
The central idea underlying Kant’s principle of Right is that such interferences are 
wrongful because they are incompatible with the other’s agency: in the first case 
destroying the capacity for agency; in the second case usurping it. Moral autonomy is 
not directly in issue here: the UPR is concerned only with the conditions under which 
the freedom of persons as agents – beings with the capacity to formulate ends and 
deploy means for their attainment – could be secured. If agents are to co-exist as such, 
the external freedom of each must be limited so as to be compatible with the equal 
freedom of every other.44 It follows that the system of rights required by the UPR 
must render persons’ spheres of external freedom mutually consistent; and that, as a 
system of restrictions on external freedom, it should apply ‘in accordance with a 
universal law’ – that is, the same restrictions should apply equally to all.45 
 
Occupying the first level within Kant’s system of rights is an ‘innate’ right to 
freedom, borne by human beings conceived of simply as agents: that is, as having 
recourse to nothing other than their innate means (their own bodily and mental 
                                                 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Ibid. p.387 (6:230). 
41
 Adherence to rational principle – and the acknowledgement of others as equally rational beings – is 
therefore constitutive of external freedom, no less than internal freedom. On the propensity of this view 
of freedom to trouble liberal individualist readings of Kant, see Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and Modern 
Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), esp. Ch. 3 and 4. 
42
 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals pp.374-5 (6:213) (distinguishing between choosing an end and 
merely wishing it); Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) p.14. Agency is thus what distinguishes persons 
from things, which can only be objects of persons’ choices (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals p.378 
(6:223)). 
43
 On this, see in particular Ripstein, Force and Freedom pp.43-5. 
44
 “Right is … the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of 
another in accordance with a universal law of freedom.” (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals p.387 
(6:230)). Or as Kant puts it elsewhere, “Right is the restriction of each individual's freedom so that it 
harmonises with the freedom of everyone else (in so far as this is possible within the terms of the 
general law)” (Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: That may be Correct in Theory, but it is no 
use in Practice” [hereinafter “Theory and Practice”] in Gregor (ed.) Immanuel Kant: Practical 
Philosophy pp.279-309 (8:275-8:309), p.290 (8:290)) (References to “Theory and Practice” are all to 
this translation.). 
45
 Thomas W. Pogge, “Kant’s Theory of Justice” Kant-Studien 79 (1988) pp.407-433, 413. 
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powers) to pursue their ends in the empirical world.46 It entails a right to use one’s 
own powers as one sees fit subject to the equivalent right of everyone else (hence, for 
example, using one’s powers to enslave others is wrongful). For Kant, however, 
freedom requires that persons also be able to have ‘external objects of choice’ at their 
disposal.  Thus, a second level of Right – private right, regulating persons’ use of 
these means for pursuing their ends – can be rationally ‘postulated’ as an extension of 
the innate right to freedom and thereby also of the UPR. Invoking the divisions of 
Roman private law, Kant presents private right as necessarily reducible to three 
categories: property rights (subsisting in respect of things), contract rights (subsisting 
in respect of others’ actions) and what he calls domestic rights (subsisting in respect 
of other persons as such).47 Private right is however impossible except in “a rightful 
condition, under an authority giving laws publicly.”48 Thus the third level in Kant’s 
system is public right, whereby a public authority exercising legislative, executive and 
judicial functions can enable private rights to be legitimately acquired, enforced and 
applied. Kant illustrates the problems arising in a ‘state of nature’ (a condition in 
which innate rights are insecure, and private rights can apply only provisionally, 
because of the absence of public right49) through his discussion of what is involved in 
initially acquiring a property right. This acquisition – though itself an exercise of 
external freedom – is a unilateral act that purports to exclude all others from the 
putative object of property, and so compromises the freedom of everyone else by 
subjecting them to the choice of the acquirer. A state of nature, then, is a condition in 
which everyone is at all times subject to the unilateral choices of everyone else.50 
Since this condition is inconsistent with the possibility of anyone’s agency, a ‘civil’ 
condition in which individual rights could be endorsed, and rendered secure and 
determinate, by a public will – a public authority that acts for all – is morally required.  
 
Public right in turn has three dimensions. The first (just considered) regulates the 
relations of citizen-subjects within a state; the second is a system of international 
right, regulating relations between states; and the third is a system of what Kant calls 
‘cosmopolitan’ right, regulating the relations of ‘citizens of the world’ (that is, 
individuals considered apart from their membership of any state) to foreign states. In 
the Rechtslehre and in “Toward Perpetual Peace” (an essay published in 1795) Kant 
defines the content of cosmopolitan right as limited to a ‘right of hospitality:’51 “the 
right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land 
                                                 
46
 “Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with 
the freedom of every other in accordance with universal law, is the only original right belonging to 
every man by virtue of his humanity” Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals p.393 (6:238). Kant defines 
this ‘innate’ right as “that which belongs to everyone by nature, independently of any act that would 
establish a right” (ibid. (6: 237)) and distinguishes it from an acquired right, “for which such an act is 
required” (ibid).   
47
 Domestic rights recall the Roman law of persons. For Ripstein, they are rights of ‘status’ (Force and 
Freedom pp.70-77), characterized by the incapacity of the party in respect of whom they are held to 
consent to the choices made for him or her by the right-holder. He claims that for Kant, such rights are 
exceptional and strictly limited: an example would be the rights of parents in respect of their children. 
48
 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals p.409 (6:255). 
49
 On this see Ripstein, Force and Freedom Ch. 6. 
50
 Ibid. p.38. 
51
 Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace” (1795), in Gregor (ed.) Immanuel Kant: Practical 
Philosophy pp.315-351 (8:341-386), at pp.328-331 (8:357-360) (references to “Toward Perpetual 
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of another.”52 Arguably, however, Kant sees the totality of rightful relations – 
comprising all three dimensions of public right – as forming a cosmopolitan polity. 
For Kant, all forms of public law have only provisional validity until such a polity has 
been established, because only in that event could a condition of war – an 
international state of nature – be definitively brought to an end in a context of global 
interdependence.53 “[We] must work toward establishing perpetual peace and the kind 
of constitution that seems to us most conducive to it (say, a republicanism of all 
states, together and separately).”54 Involved in Kant’s concept of Right, then, is an 
idea of progress towards a just political order:55 a global system of reciprocal external 
freedom, realized through law. The establishment of sovereign states is only the first 
step towards this end. Central to Kant’s account of how further progress is possible 
are two interrelated principles: the principle of the independence of every member of 
each state as a citizen – “that is, as a co-legislator”56 – and the principle of publicity.  
 
Citizenship is a pivotal concept in Kant’s political theory, but his use of the concept is 
apt to confuse. He defines the quality requisite to citizenship – “apart from the natural 
one (of not being a child or a woman)”57 – as “only that of being one’s own master 
(sui juris), hence having some property … that supports him.”58 This in turn means 
that the citizen is one who is able to sustain himself (sic) only by alienating what 
belongs to him and not by providing services to others: only then can it be said that he 
has that civic independence which qualifies him as ‘serving only the commonwealth.’ 
One way of reading this stipulation is as revealing a bias towards propertied men as 
solely equipped and entitled to participate in the polity. Yet Kant’s property 
requirement can also be interpreted as implying only that the capacity for agency must 
be supported by the material conditions under which it is possible to be one’s own 
master: that, to be meaningful, political agency must be substantive and not merely 
formal. Further, because Kant clearly intended to offer a dynamic account of the 
forces that might move political institutions towards the ideal of justice, citizenship 
here can be understood not as a static condition for which a person either is or is not 
qualified, but as an ideal of political ‘maturity’ towards which all persons (children 
and women included) may aspire and from which no one, therefore, is in principle 
barred.59   
                                                 
52
 Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace” pp.328-9 (8:357-8). This right “belongs to all human beings by 
virtue of the right of possession in common of the earth’s surface on which, as a sphere, they cannot 
disperse infinitely” (ibid p.329 (8:358)). The meaning of hospitality is however heavily contested: 
some for example link it to the rights of refugees (see Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, 
Residents, and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)); others to rights to engage in 
international trade (see e.g. B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka, Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A 
Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.205-11); others stress Kant’s 
insistence that cosmopolitan right ‘shall be limited to conditions of hospitality’ for the visitor, and does 
not amount to a right to settle, thereby positioning colonial occupation outside its scope (see Peter 
Niesen, “Colonialism and Hospitality” Politics and Ethics Review, 3(1) (2007), pp. 90–108).  
53
 Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace” p.322 (8:349n).   
54
 Ibid. p.491 (6:354).  
55
 On this dimension of Kant’s political thought, see Elisabeth Ellis, Kant’s Politics: Provisional 
Theory for an Uncertain World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), esp. Ch. 3. 
56
 Kant, “Theory and Practice” p.294 (8:294). 
57
 Ibid. p.295 (8:295). 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 See further on the theme of independence in Kant’s political thought, Howard Williams, “Liberty, 
Equality and Independence: Core Concepts in Kant’s Political Philosophy” in G. Bird (ed.) A 
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Further interpretive difficulties arise when one considers the form of political 
participation that Kant envisages for the citizenry. He frequently asserts that a rightful 
condition only exists where a legal order, together with its constitutional structure, 
actualizes the idea of the “general (united) will”60 of the whole ‘people.’61 He also 
suggests that this idea requires that the people considered as a collective entity (i.e. 
the citizenry) author the laws binding the people considered severally as a sovereign’s 
subjects. Yet on closer inspection it becomes clear that these are not arguments for 
popular sovereignty in any conventional sense. For Kant, constitutional founding is 
not to be understood as an actual assertion, at some point in history, of popular 
‘constituent power’; and he denies that Right requires the actual consent of all 
empirical legal subjects to the laws promulgated by a constituted sovereign. The idea 
of the general united will is only an ‘idea of reason,’ binding the sovereign “to give 
his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole 
people and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has 
joined in voting for such a will.”62 Moreover, only the sovereign, not the subject, can 
be the judge of whether its laws meet this standard. Faced with laws that in the 
subject’s view a unified public will could not possibly have endorsed, the subject 
must nonetheless obey.63 To do otherwise would be to precipitate a return to the state 
of nature in which no unique law-making authority in fact exists and everyone makes, 
applies and enforces his own unilateral judgements.64  
 
What then becomes of the idea of the citizen as co-legislator? It is at this point that the 
relevance of publicity to Kant’s analysis of both citizenship and justice (or Right) 
becomes clear. In a nutshell, Kant’s message is this: subjects must obey the laws in 
force, but as citizens they should also argue publicly about their rightness. Subjects – 
while acting ‘externally’ in obedience to laws – may nonetheless harbour 
conscientious objections to them ‘internally’. These doubts testify to the freedom of 
subjects, while constrained in what they can do vis-à-vis the laws in force, 
nonetheless to think about their rightness. Such independent opinion-formation is 
perfectly legitimate, even in a civil condition, since “every human being still has his 
inalienable rights, which he can never give up even if he wanted to and about which 
he is authorized to judge for himself…;”65 and each is therefore entitled to judge the 
laws in force wanting as failing to respect these rights. However it is “freedom of the 
pen” – the freedom to publicly articulate these opinions – that is “the sole palladium 
of the people’s rights,”66 the only guarantee that laws and institutions will in fact be 
brought into conformity with Right. It is through the free public criticism of unjust 
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 Kant, “Theory and Practice” p.295 (8:295).  
61
 In “Theory and Practice” Kant refers to the ‘original contract’ by which a multitude establishes a 
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laws that citizens become co-legislators – by collectively constructing the standards of 
reason that can guide law-making towards realisation of the general united will. As 
explained further in Section 2 below, these standards are not mere aggregations of 
individual opinions, or victors in the clash of opinions, but may claim universal 
validity because forged in a specifically public process of argument through which 
reason itself emerges as the victor. It is this conviction that underlies Kant’s claim (in 
“Toward Perpetual Peace”) that there is an a priori (and not just an empirical) 
connection between public justifiability (publicity) and justice or Right. That is, 
publicity is not only appropriate on prudential grounds (because fallible empirical 
sovereigns are liable to promulgate laws that contradict the rightful condition 
demanded by reason, and public argument enables these errors to be foreseen or 
corrected), but is a transcendentally necessary condition for just laws. Further, Kant 
seems to argue here that publicity can be the mechanism of progress towards a global 
system of Right.67 In the absence of (or until)68 the creation of a world republic with 
supreme coercive power to make, enforce and apply global laws, the united public 
opinion of world citizens can substitute for such laws, constituting universal standards 
by reference to which abuses of political power everywhere can be judged.69  
 
At both the domestic and the global levels, then, open public debate is for Kant the 
mediator between principles of justice and the practice of politics. It is the crucial 
mechanism by which civic independence is exercised and through which it is 
enhanced; and it therefore underlies the development of an increasingly mature 
citizenry and progress towards a just polity.70 But as the next Section will show, the 
public use of reason has an even wider significance within Kant’s philosophical 
system, for he sees it as indispensable to the advance of Enlightenment in every 
dimension.  
 
 
2 Freedom as Communicative Autonomy: Kant on Public Reason 
 
The most obvious clues to the true meaning and import of the public use of reason for 
Kant emerge from some of his shorter journalistic essays, writings that were aimed at 
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a wider audience than that addressed by his more technical philosophical works.71 In 
one of these essays, published in 1784 – “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’” – Kant characterizes enlightenment as the attainment of maturity 
through the use of reason: thinking and deciding for oneself rather than deferring to 
established authority or tradition. In principle, Kant argues here, maturity is possible 
for all persons, because all are equipped with the capacity for independence. Yet 
through laziness, cowardice or irresolution, individuals are apt to remain in thrall to 
‘guardians’ – Kant instances priests and doctors – and so in a state of self-incurred 
minority.  
 
As Katerina Deligiorgi has noted,72 there is a parallel between the account presented 
in Kant’s practical philosophy of ‘pathologically determined’ action – action 
determined by sensuous inclinations – and the account he offers here of allowing 
one’s thinking to be dictated by forces external to oneself: while Kant acknowledges 
the prevalence of heteronomous thought, no less than heteronomous action, he insists 
that what essentially characterizes the human subject is the capacity for the free (i.e. 
autonomous) use of reason.  What Kant urges in general, then, is the emancipation of 
our reason from everything that undermines its authority for us. Yet whereas his 
practical philosophy yields a method or principle – the Categorical Imperative – that, 
if followed, will (he claims) enable one to act autonomously, here Kant suggests that 
free thought depends only on public communication: “[f]or … enlightenment, 
however, nothing is required but … freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all 
matters.”73 It is not immediately obvious why this should be so – at least, it is not 
clear why the freedom to express something in public should be any guarantee of the 
speaker’s progress towards intellectual independence (since the views expressed 
might simply be hackneyed or formulaic, or the speaker a puppet of some ‘guardian’). 
Embedded in Kant’s idea of a public use of reason, then, must be a normative 
criterion of publicity: some principle that could guide thought, as the Categorical 
Imperative guides action. Yet none is spelled out in this essay. The only definition 
Kant offers of a public use of reason is this: “that use which anyone may make of 
[reason] as a scholar before the entire public of the world of readers.”74  
 
In the context of the essay, the immediate significance of the italicized terms is that 
they serve to distinguish a public from a ‘private’ use of reason. However Kant’s 
conception of a private use of reason is somewhat peculiar.75 It is not a use of reason 
that is merely personal to the reasoner and undisclosed to anyone else. Rather, it is 
“that [use] which someone makes of [reason] in a certain civil post or office”76 and 
the examples Kant invokes in “What is Enlightenment?” to illustrate his meaning 
here all refer to utterances directed at an audience: a priest’s sermon, an army 
officer’s orders, a tax official’s demands, and so forth. It would seem that when these 
representatives of ecclesiastical or state authorities interpret the latter’s dictates and 
address their interpretations to these authorities’ subjects, or when they speak in the 
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exercise of an authority delegated to them from above, they engage in private uses of 
reason in Kant’s sense. They reason publicly, on the other hand, when they speak 
their own minds on issues within the jurisdiction of these authorities. Thus although 
the priest – in his private capacity of officer of the church – is obliged to preach 
religious orthodoxy to his flock from the pulpit “for he [is] employed by [the church] 
on that condition”,77 as a scholar (i.e. as an intellectual) “he has complete freedom 
and is even called upon to communicate to the public all his carefully examined and 
well-intentioned thoughts about what is erroneous in that creed and his suggestions 
for a better arrangement of the religious and ecclesiastical body.”78 The normative 
force of this freedom and calling is conveyed by Kant’s insistence that it would be a 
“crime against human nature”79 for members of the clergy to bind themselves never 
to doubt an established religious creed in public: this would be an instance of 
renouncing enlightenment altogether, which in turn would “violate the sacred right of 
humanity.”80 Yet once again Kant does not explain in so many words where the 
normative force of this ‘public doubting’ emanates from: how exactly it contributes to 
enlightenment.  
 
“What is Orientation in Thinking?,” published in 1786, is one of a number of texts in 
which Kant finally reveals what might be called the ‘supreme principle of rational 
thinking’, the analogue of the Categorical Imperative that was suggested by, but 
missing from, “What is Enlightenment?”. It is contained in the following proposition:  
 
To think for oneself means to look within oneself (i.e. in one’s own reason) for 
the supreme touchstone of truth; and the maxim of thinking for oneself at all 
times is enlightenment…. To employ one’s own reason means simply to ask 
oneself, whenever one is urged to accept something, whether one finds it 
possible to transform the reason for accepting it, or the rule which follows 
from what is accepted, into a universal principle governing the use of one’s 
reason.81 
 
In form this is very similar to the Categorical Imperative, which is itself a principle 
requiring the moral reasoner to assess whether her subjective rules of action could, 
without contradiction, be universalizable. And like the Categorical Imperative, which 
orients moral action not via a substantive moral code but by means of a procedure that 
operates only negatively, this principle does not tell us what to think. Instead it urges 
us to examine the criteria underlying our acceptance or rejection of propositions with 
a view to identifying whether these are mere prejudices, arising from the passivity of 
our mental faculties, or criteria that could be valid for anyone: only in the latter case 
are the propositions they support worthy of acceptance. Now if thinking for oneself is 
solely a matter of reflecting on one’s thought processes by the light of this 
universalizability test, it is difficult to see what the connection is between 
enlightenment and public debate. Yet Kant here reaffirms his earlier emphasis on the 
inextricable link between individual freedom of thought and the freedom to think “in 
community with others to whom we communicate our thoughts and who 
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communicate their thoughts to us.”82 So close is the connection here forged between 
public debate and autonomous thinking, indeed, that Kant goes so far as to state that 
“the same external constraint which deprives people of the freedom to communicate 
their thoughts in public also removes their freedom of thought.”83 Yet there is at least 
a tension between the principle that before accepting a proposition I must ask myself 
whether I can judge it to be universally valid (which seems at most to involve an ideal 
conversation with an imagined community of reasoners), and the principle that I must 
first test whether it meets with general assent following an actual process of open 
public debate.  
  
This brings us closer to where the normative significance of Kantian publicity resides. 
The key point is that the public use of reason (implying both the universalizability of 
a proposition and its availability for open public debate) is indispensable to the task of 
securing the authority of reason – in politics, knowledge and human affairs generally 
– and displacing the authority of unquestioned tradition or power. This dimension of 
Kant’s thought has been explored with particular rigour by Onora O’Neill.84 For 
O’Neill, “What is Enlightenment?” is best read as characterizing ‘private’ uses of 
reason by reference to two related features that render them “deprived (privatus) [and] 
incomplete”85 by comparison with what Kant calls public uses of reason. The first is 
the partial reliance of private reason’s authority on the power that attends the 
reasoner’s superior status vis-à-vis her audience: “[i]n all such communication there is 
a tacit, uncriticized and unjustified premise of submission to the ‘authority’ that 
power of office establishes,”86 which in turn means that “[a]t some points in debates 
about such communications argument must stop and authority be invoked.”87 The 
second is that the audience for such utterances is necessarily restricted to those who 
accept the speaker’s ability to invoke his or her superior status as an argument-stopper 
in this way. A public use of reason, by contrast, is one that presupposes no authority 
other than reason, and is thereby in principle available for debate by ‘the entire 
public.’  
 
O’Neill herself characterizes utterances of this kind as ‘publicizable’, and notes that 
Kant clearly prioritizes publicizability (in this sense of worthiness to be publicly 
debated) over publicity (actual public debate). Yet she also stresses that whether a 
proposition is publicizable cannot for Kant depend simply on whether the proponent 
believes it to be so, or on whether it is stated to conform to transcendent standards of 
rationality that have been established in advance of its communication. Even 
propositions that are believed in good faith to invoke no authority other than reason 
might be informed by hidden prejudices of which their proponents are unaware; and 
this danger cannot be circumvented by invoking a higher authority as the guarantor of 
reason without regressing to a state of tutelage. Of necessity, then, authoritative 
criteria of rationality have to be constructed, and this requires a process of trial, error, 
correction and retrial – an ongoing collective task, guided only by the idea that the 
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authority striven for must be that to which all can agree.88 This in turn means that 
each person should reason in a way that recognises – in oneself and in everyone else – 
the freedom to think for oneself, while at the same time acknowledging the necessity 
to think in community with others. It is only through sustained practices of free, 
critical and universal debate that the task of constructing reason’s authority – and 
progress towards a fully Enlightened world – stands any chance of accomplishment. 
 
What then are the principles by reference to which reason’s authority can be 
collectively constituted through the process of open debate? Kant offers no particular 
specification in any of his writings on the public use of reason, but here again 
O’Neill’s interpretation is helpful. The most basic of these principles can, she argues, 
be extrapolated from Kant’s moral theory, in particular the prohibitions on using 
coercion and lying in one’s communications with others. She finds other principles 
elsewhere in Kant’s oeuvre – especially in the Critique of Judgment89 and in 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,90 where general guidance is offered on 
how to think in community with a plurality of others who cannot be guaranteed in 
advance to agree.91 Briefly, this guidance reduces to three maxims: ‘think for oneself’; 
‘think from the standpoint of everyone else’; and ‘think consistently’. The first of 
these maxims requires active and unprejudiced, rather than passive, thinking: 
otherwise no genuine plurality of perspectives can emerge.92 The second requires 
reflection on one’s initial judgments from the perspective of all so that any partiality 
conditioning them can be corrected.93 Far from being a matter of ascending to a 
neutral Archimedean point above the conflict of opinions, this process should be 
oriented toward comparing one’s independently formed judgments with the actual 
viewpoints of others,94 and taking any discrepancies as signalling that one’s reasoning 
may be erroneous. Since the results of this reflective movement will constantly be in 
flux, contradictions in one’s thinking can be expected to emerge. Hence the third 
maxim implies a preparedness to work through these contradictions in an unceasing 
effort to integrate all of one’s considered judgments into a whole which is unified 
under common criteria.95  
 
To think and communicate in accordance with these principles is to think and 
communicate autonomously. It should be clear that this intellectual/communicative 
autonomy is irreducible to freedom of expression in the standard liberal sense of 
freedom to choose what to say and whether to say it.96 This is not to suggest that 
expression can be arbitrarily prohibited or interfered with, but individual expressive 
liberty is only a condition, not constitutive, of what Kant actually has in mind as the 
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practice of public reason. Onora O’Neill invokes the idea of toleration to mark the 
distinction, and I adopt it in what follows. Toleration here on the one hand signifies a 
responsiveness towards the communications of others (“[w]e do not tolerate others’ 
communications if we are merely passive and noninterfering”),97 and on the other 
hand the act of communicating itself in so far as that act is oriented towards 
conformity with the principles and maxims identified above. On O’Neill’s 
interpretation, an utterance which is, for example, purely egoistic,98 or dictated by an 
external authority, or trivial, or unintelligible, could only be an expression, which is to 
say a failed communication (since expression is parasitic on communication) that fails 
because it is ‘intolerant’ of its audience;99 while a communication which is greeted 
with indifference, even if not interfered with, is treated as if it were a mere expression 
and so not ‘tolerated’ as a communication. In general, then, the public use of reason – 
where ‘use’ signifies processes involving both communication and reception – 
presupposes toleration.  
 
It was noted in Section 2 above that Kant saw the public use of reason as the motor of 
progress towards a just political order. It should now be clear why he saw it as the key 
to the advance of Enlightenment generally. The process of Enlightenment – and with 
it, progress towards a free or ‘mature’ culture characterised by the mutual recognition 
of the intellectual autonomy of all – depends on social practices of tolerant 
communicative interaction which are both public and fully inclusive. Although 
oriented towards the horizon of universal consensus, these practices are essentially 
constituted of disagreements with, and contestations of, perspectives that happen to 
be generally accepted – albeit within the limits set by the presupposition of all critical 
intellectual activity, which is toleration. If afforded space in which to flourish, 
principled communicative practices can fuel an emancipatory process that is not 
personal to each individual so much as it moves humanity as a whole towards a 
situation in which ‘everything submits’ to criticism.100 And since reason for Kant 
owes its authority to nothing other than criticism,101 reason would in that situation rule 
supreme in human affairs.  
 
 
3 The Legal Structure of Communicative Freedom 
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The question that must now be addressed is whether Kant envisages any particular 
legal arrangements as necessary for the flourishing of tolerant communicative 
interactions in the sense outlined in the previous Section. The dominant view is that 
the answer is ‘no’: the public use of reason is not in fact conceived of by Kant as 
amenable to being organised in terms of claims that can be redeemed through rights – 
even a right to free speech – at all. Rather, it is sustained by social practices and 
orientations; and Kant establishes the legitimacy of these practices and orientations by 
reference to his conception of reason, not Right.102  
 
It is undeniable that Kant’s case for the free use of reason in public is advanced in 
terms that appear to suggest that it is a ‘right’ of human reason, not an individual 
(subjective) right properly so called:   
 
To this freedom … belongs the freedom to exhibit the thoughts and doubts 
which one cannot resolve oneself for public judgment without thereupon being 
decried as a malcontent and dangerous citizen. This lies already in the original 
right of human reason, which recognizes no other judge than universal human 
reason itself, in which everyone has a voice; and since all improvement of 
which our condition is capable must come from this, such a right is holy and 
must not be curtailed.103 
 
If anything, it would seem to follow that the counterpart to this ‘right’ is a duty – but a 
duty that each human being owes to humanity, not to other individuals. Nonetheless, 
it could be argued that the freedom to engage in a public use of reason is required by 
that aspect of Kant’s Universal Principle of Right that, in Pogge’s words, “demands 
… the thriving of reason, and the promotion of its development both in the species 
and in each particular person.”104 Otherwise put, Kant can be construed as arguing 
that justice demands not only a legal order guaranteeing equal spheres of external 
freedom for all, but a set of legal arrangements conducive to Enlightenment in the 
broadest sense. And since free public criticism is, for Kant, absolutely central to 
Enlightenment, it is at least arguable that Kant sees law as having a role to play in 
facilitating it.  
 
What then is the juridical structure of free communication as Kant sees it? It is first 
necessary to recall that for Kant, a system of rights is a set of pure rational concepts 
that define the morally necessary form of interaction between persons prior to any 
positive laws which would give effect to these concepts. Pending the 
institutionalisation of these concepts in positive law, persons can only be said to have 
morally valid rights claims against others: in Kant’s words, “(moral) capacities for 
putting others under obligations.”105 Moreover, a claim to right is intrinsically 
coercive: it is indeed simply a claim that others ought to be constrained to treat the 
claimant in certain ways. Kant himself clearly takes the view that there is a right (in 
the specific sense just outlined) not to be prevented from saying what one chooses: he 
states in the Rechtslehre that in so far as speech does not infringe on the rights of 
others, the freedom to utter one’s thoughts to others is protected by the innate right to 
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freedom.106 Even lies and deceitful promises are within the sphere of freedom to 
which each is entitled simply by virtue of being a person: though immoral, these 
utterances can be regarded as rightful in so far as they do not infringe the addressee’s 
sphere of external freedom by diminishing that to which the addressee is entitled.107 It 
is also clear that the right to say what one chooses is a necessary condition of 
publicity’s operating as a mechanism for securing progress towards a just state and, 
more generally, that it is a necessary condition of the public use of reason in any 
discursive domain at all. It is necessary, because freedom of speech is the sine qua 
non of the possibility of communicative freedom in the sense outlined in Section 2 
above, and so also of rational discourse, including in particular discourse about 
injustice:  
 
Certainly one may say, “Freedom to speak or write can be taken from us by a 
superior power, but never the freedom to think.” But how much, and how 
correctly, would we think if we did not think as it were in common with 
others, with whom we mutually communicate! Thus one can well say that the 
external power which wrests from man the freedom publicly to communicate 
his thoughts also takes away the freedom to think – the sole jewel that remains 
to us under all civil repression and through which alone counsel against all the 
evils of that state can be taken.108 
 
The argument in the passage just quoted is that without the possibility of individual 
expression, communication with others is impossible, and without communication 
with others, rational thought is impossible: in other words, the right to free speech is 
here justified, not by reference to the innate right to freedom, but by reference to the 
demands of reason and the possibility of Enlightenment. More precisely, Kant claims 
that since speech is the indispensable means of testing one’s individual opinions 
against the opinions of others, the right to expressive freedom is justified by the 
maxim of broad-minded thinking (thinking from the standpoint of everyone else, and 
thereby transcending the partiality of one’s own opinions) which was referred to in 
Section 2 above as one of his three maxims of thinking:  
 
The logical egoist considers it unnecessary to test his judgment by the 
understanding of others … as if he had no need at all for this touchstone 
(criterium veritatis externum). But we cannot dispense with this means for 
assuring the truth of our judgments; this is so certain that it may be the main 
reason why educated people clamour so urgently for freedom of the press. For 
if we are denied this freedom, we are deprived at the same time of an 
important means for testing the correctness of our own judgments and left 
open to error.”109  
 
However, though necessary, freedom of speech is not a sufficient condition for the 
public use of reason, precisely because freedom of speech is also grounded in the 
innate right to freedom. As such, it includes the right to use one’s power of expression 
to manipulate one’s interlocutors; and it implies no duty to listen and so no duty to 
engage with or respond to them. It follows that there can be no right in anyone to 
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force anyone else to engage in tolerant communicative interactions. To say that I have 
a morally valid claim to force others to permit me to engage in the free public use of 
my reason is either tautological or incoherent: my claim to freedom to engage in the 
public use of my reason adds nothing to my claim to be free to say what I choose 
other than the contradictory (in Kant’s terms) notion that others can be compelled to 
participate with me in processes of public reasoning oriented towards our collective 
emancipation. In short, for Kant, each person has a right to speak, but no (strictly 
juridical) duty to speak ‘maturely’ and no (strictly juridical) right that anyone else do 
so. 
 
But granted that the public use of reason is unenforceable, it does not follow that Kant 
saw law as having no role to play in fostering conditions conducive to its advance and 
counteracting manipulative, egoistic or generally intolerant (in the sense outlined in 
Section 2 above) speech. My claim here is that Kant does indeed conceive of a 
systematic legal structure for the protection of communicative freedom, but that he 
sees this structure as constituted by the rights of authors, publishers and the reading 
public in relation to authorial communications. An important clue to the significance 
Kant ascribes to authorship is to be found in the two passages quoted above, where 
freedom to speak is explicitly linked with freedom to ‘write’ and freedom of the 
‘press’. These linkages reveal how in practice the sphere of public reasoning, the 
cosmopolitan Lesewelt, was in Kant’s view to be realized: through the production, 
distribution and consumption by ‘educated people’ of cultural artefacts, namely 
books. As Kant clearly recognized, to ‘speak’ in this setting is in fact to communicate 
one’s words in writing to the ‘reading public’; and since communicating to the 
‘entire’ reading public is of the essence of a public use of reason, writing for that 
public necessarily involves the mass production of one’s texts as books, and the 
distribution of these to a public with the practical capabilities to read them. Hence 
freedom of speech must involve the freedom to communicate one’s words in writing 
to the ‘reading public’; and freedom of the press must involve the freedoms to mass 
produce one’s texts as books, to distribute these to the public, to facilitate public 
communication by printing and publishing the books of others, and to acquire and 
read printed material. Indeed, authorial communication by means of printed texts 
cannot have been regarded by Kant as merely subsidiary to speech: it is in fact more 
conducive than oral communication to the public use of reason, in that it orients the 
author towards an unknown readership and so promotes an awareness of the necessity 
of communicating in terms that could be accepted by all. The only conclusion one can 
draw from reading Kant’s remarks on publicity in relation to those on publishing, I 
believe, is that Kant elaborated his views on the rights of authors, publishers and 
readers with a view to showing how commercial publishing should be legally 
structured if the public sphere – the institutional space for the public use of reason – 
was to be nurtured. In the remainder of this Section I reveal the lineaments of this 
structure as set out in the 1785 Essay: the author’s innate right to say (only) what s/he 
chooses to say, the publisher’s private right to appropriate profits from publishing the 
author’s words, the reading public’s right to an undistorted communicative relation 
with the author and – underpinning all of these rights – the universal calling to engage 
in tolerant communicative interactions through the medium of print. I argue that Kant 
must be read as conceiving of all of this as forming an integrated legal regime 
oriented towards advancing – albeit indirectly – the public use of reason. 
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Ostensibly, the 1785 Essay is simply concerned with showing how the private rights 
(in the sense elaborated in the Rechtslehre) of publishers are engaged by the 
unauthorized publication of an author’s book. Kant commences his consideration of 
the wrongfulness of unauthorized publication by establishing that this act wrongs the 
authorized publisher. The authorized publisher, he reasons, is one who has received a 
mandate from the author to communicate the author’s discourse to the public. A 
mandate is the focus of a contract, the purpose of which is to empower one person to 
be another’s agent by “carrying on another’s affairs in his place and in his name,”110 
so the publishing contract enables a publisher, through the author’s writing, to 
discourse publicly in the author’s name.111 Kant insists that such empowerments must 
be exclusive, since otherwise rival publishers would be competing to sell the same 
book and none could profit from doing so.112 Moreover, unless the author has 
reserved the right to object to the transfer of the empowerment to another publisher, it 
is itself alienable by the publisher.113 Absent such a transfer, the unauthorized re-
printer usurps the empowerment and steals the legitimate publisher’s profits. Hence 
“it is not the author but the publisher empowered by him who is wronged”114 by the 
re-printer’s activities. Thus far, the rights of the author seem marginal to Kant’s 
analysis. However as explained above, Kant also explicitly argues that publishing an 
author’s writing without his consent is tantamount to forcing him to speak against his 
will, which wrongs the author because the right to be one’s own master in respect of 
one’s speech is an aspect of the innate right to freedom: “[t]he right of the author is … 
an innate right in his own person, namely, to prevent another from having him speak 
to the public without his consent…”.115 One’s innate right to freedom is the right to 
determine how one’s innate physical and intellectual capacities shall be exercised and 
to what ends; otherwise put, it is the right that no one else shall interfere with or usurp 
those capacities. Thus the authorized publisher’s acquired right to the use of the 
author’s innate power to speak to the reading public depends on the author’s consent 
to what would otherwise be a violation of his or her innate right.116  
 
The innate right of the author is not a right of property, and it is inalienable. These 
conclusions follow from Kant’s conception of authorial speech as ‘an action 
belonging to the author’s person’: an author’s intellectual creation is an exercise of 
the author’s innate capacities which, as such, cannot be owned (for that would be to 
presuppose that a person is also a thing, which is contradictory) but to which, as such, 
only that person could have a right.117 Now it was noted in Section 1 above that for 
Kant, the freedom/calling to publicly voice criticisms of existing political 
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arrangements resides in all citizens, and citizens are persons who can live by selling 
what is theirs. Kant admits that it can be difficult to distinguish such persons from 
those who live by selling their services, but the key is whether a man produces some 
thing (opus) which is his to alienate.118 Prima facie, professional authors seem to have 
no property to sell, and so appear to lack this key requisite of citizenship. However in 
the 1785 Essay, Kant establishes that authors are indeed their own masters on the 
basis that an author produces an “opus”119 (a copy of his text in the form of a 
manuscript) which is his to alienate. An author, he implies, can sell his ‘copies’ (i.e. 
the handwritten or printed copies of his text that he himself has made) direct to the 
public, or he can hand this trade over to an intermediary by selling his manuscript to a 
publisher and making a further contract with the publisher empowering the latter to 
make copies and sell these to the public. The publisher’s authorization to publish the 
manuscript – the focus of this further contract – derives, as we have seen, from the 
author’s (inalienable) right not to be compelled to speak. But that right makes 
practicable the right to sell the opus which is the manuscript, and so also the 
capacities characteristic of the citizen, for in the absence of a right to control 
unauthorized publication, no publisher would purchase a manuscript from an author in 
the first place. It is arguably for this reason that Kant’s major concern in the 1785 
Essay is in fact to legitimize the book trade, the publishing agreements that underpin 
it, and the profits that may be realized from it: he aims not to denigrate publishers and 
the publishing trade, but to show how the trade can be rightfully organized, because in 
its absence professional authors could not be regarded as having the qualities requisite 
for citizenship. 
 
Already, then, it can be seen that authorship has a crucial, and interrelated, set of 
implications for Kant.120 As inscription – i.e. as the production of a physical 
manuscript – it attracts a property right in the manuscript that both founds a legitimate 
trade in copies (an economic pursuit which the author cannot undermine by 
authorizing competing publishers) and at the same time positions the professional 
author to exercise civic independence. As expression – i.e. as an activity for which the 
manuscript is the vehicle – it attracts a right that is ‘innate in the author’s own 
person’: a right (which is not a property right) to exert a continuing control over his or 
her speech. However, it is as communication – i.e. as an address to the reading public 
– that authorship is also culturally significant. The central right adumbrated in the 
1785 Essay – the inalienable right “that no one may deliver the same speech to the 
public other than in … the author’s name”121 – clearly has implications not only for 
the individual author but also for the advance of an emancipated culture. To re-
circulate an author’s text unaltered without the latter’s consent is not only to deny the 
author’s innate right but to show no independence of thought in one’s 
communications with the reading public: no sign that the re-publisher has obeyed the 
injunction to ‘think for oneself.’ Correspondingly, where a reader, by re-writing an 
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author’s text with modifications, has shown evidence of an ability (however 
embryonic) to think for him- or herself, the rights of the first author in respect of the 
delivery to the public of the original text must give way to the rights of the modifier in 
respect of the public communication of the modified text. The reciprocal rights of 
author and reader here serve the wider cultural goal of facilitating that critical 
reflection on which reason’s authority depends. The same applies to the author’s right 
to object to the delivery of the modified text in his or her name and the modifier’s 
right to claim authorship of that text: these rights too are conducive to the 
development of a mature culture, because such a culture is one in which persons 
speak for themselves and take responsibility for their utterances as named individuals. 
Finally, the author’s right to object to the delivery of an altered speech in his or her 
name also preserves the integrity of the communication between that author and his or 
her readers. Not only the author, but also the audience, has a right that this 
communication be undistorted. Throughout the Essay, Kant reiterates that the author’s 
communication is with the public, and that the publisher and the book trade should 
only facilitate this communication. That the public has a right against the commercial 
intermediary to receive the author’s communication in the form the author intended 
emerges very clearly from the following passage: 
 
Were the author to die after he has given his manuscript to the publisher for 
printing and the latter has bound himself to print it, the publisher is not at 
liberty to hold the manuscript back as his property; instead, if the author has 
no heirs, the public has a right to compel him either to publish or to turn the 
manuscript over to someone else who offers to do so. For it was once an affair 
that the author wanted to carry on with the public through him and for which 
he offered himself as the agent. It is not necessary for the public to know of 
the author’s promise or to accept it; it obtains this right against the publisher 
(to perform something) by law alone. It is not a right of the public to the 
manuscript but to an affair with the author that is the basis for this. If, after the 
author’s death, the publisher were to put out his work in an abridged or 
falsified form, or in an edition smaller than the demand for it, the public would 
be authorized to compel him to correct or enlarge the edition or, failing this, to 
provide for someone else to do so. All this could not happen unless the 
publisher’s right were derived from an affair that he carries on between the 
author and the public in the author’s name.122  
 
Taken together, then, it seems clear that the rights set out in the 1785 Essay are 
conceived of by Kant as tending to yield the conditions in which authors would 
advance their own reason (by speaking for themselves) and at the same time advance 
public reason by communicating their thoughts, undistorted by commercial 
imperatives, to a critical mass public which is free to read and respond. The final 
section below will briefly sketch some of the possible implications of viewing 
contemporary copyright law through Kant’s lens. 
 
 
4 Copyright Law, Communicative Freedom and the Global Public Sphere 
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An appropriate starting point here is Abraham Drassinower’s claim that the normative 
heart of copyright law resides, not in the right to control unauthorized copying as 
such, but in what he calls the right of public presentation: an author’s exclusive right 
to address the public, in his or her own words, in the form of a work.123 Copyright 
law, Drassinower argues, necessarily takes authorial activity to be an instance of 
speech. All of its central categories – including in particular the exclusive rights of the 
author and the major defences available to users of copyright material – should, he 
argues, be (re-) interpreted in relation to a conceptualization of works of authorship as 
communications to the public.124 This would limit the current scope of copyright 
protection, because when re-interpreted in this way, not every act of copying can 
properly be regarded as infringing. Only reproductions of the work qua 
communicative act – or reproductions which are “in the service of public 
presentation”125 – are normatively relevant; copies which are reproductions only “in 
the physical sense”126 are not. Copies made for personal use would fall into the 
second category, as would copies technically incidental to the reception of the work, 
such as cache copies or digital copies made while browsing online. Moreover, to 
reproduce another’s work as a work (i.e. to repeat the communicative act represented 
by the work) is – properly construed – not simply to re-communicate another’s work, 
but to “wrongfully place [one]self in another’s position as an author.”127 What 
Drassinower has in mind here, evidently, is any adoption of another’s communicative 
act as one’s own, and in a way which also involves its public presentation. There is no 
such adoption where A independently creates and communicates a work that 
coincidentally bears a similarity to a pre-existing work authored by B: the similarity, 
rightly in Drassinower’s view, does not constitute a basis for finding A liable to B. 
There should equally be no liability, in his view, if A’s use of the earlier work, though 
deliberate, is reasonably necessary for his or her own exercise of authorship,128 for in 
such a case A is addressing the public on his or her own account. (It is this 
interpretation of the wrong involved in copyright infringement that grounds 
Drassinower’s arguments, noted in the Introduction above, about the legal position of 
transformative re-users of copyright material.)  
 
Aspects of copyright law, Drassinower argues, already recognize this fundamental 
reciprocity between actual and potential future authors. One example is the so-called 
idea/expression dichotomy: the principle that where one author has not copied another 
author’s expression but has instead expressed the latter’s idea anew, s/he has shown 
independent authorship and cannot be impugned for trespassing on another’s 
authorship.129 Another example is the defence available for using a work as part of an 
exercise in criticism or review of that work. However other aspects of the current law 
– including many of those yielded by its recent expansionary tendencies – fail to 
acknowledge the equal authorial freedom of addressees. To remedy this, Drassinower 
suggests that at least some defences and exceptions to copyright protection – the vast 
majority of which currently give rise to nothing more than user ‘privileges’ and as 
such are vulnerable to being overridden by digital rights management systems and the 
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contractual ordering of user privileges that these enable – should be placed on a firmer 
legal foundation by being characterised as user ‘rights.’130 The fundamental user right, 
he suggests, is the right to engage with (as opposed to merely repeating), and respond 
publicly to, works of authorship in ways that reasonably require the use of those 
works. This is as integral to copyright law as the authorial right of public presentation, 
because it too protects authorial freedom. “Equality, then, is the category that would 
make intelligible the connection between author rights and user rights as aspects of 
the copyright system.”131 The domain protected by copyright and the public domain 
(i.e. the reservoir of intellectual materials that may be freely drawn upon in authorial 
activity) must thus be seen as two moments of a single integrated structure oriented 
towards guaranteeing equal authorial freedom for all.  
 
These conclusions – which dovetail with recent proposals to ‘constitutionalize’ the 
private relations between copyright owners and users of copyright material132 – are 
undeniably consistent with the logic of the 1785 Essay. However, what I want to 
argue here is that from the perspective of Kant’s philosophy as a whole, the structure 
of rights Drassinower envisages is in turn only intelligible as conducing to social 
emancipation by fostering the conditions under which free public criticism could be 
possible. It is his neglect of this dimension of Kant’s thought that accounts for 
Drassinower’s tendency to conflate communication with expression, and autonomy 
with agency, when theorizing the nature of the ‘speaking’ that is bound up with 
authorship and protected by authors’ rights. While he frequently asserts that copyright 
law’s point is to protect ‘communication’ – a copyright work, he insists, just “is an 
invitation to engage in dialogue”133 – Drassinower’s arguments only in fact sustain the 
claim that copyright law protects original expression: expression that originates in the 
mind of an individual.134 What he shows is that responses to the authorial acts of 
others ought to be legally guaranteed, not particularly as elements within a social 
process of communicative interaction, but as individual expressive acts in their own 
right. This begs the question of why individual expressivity merits copyright law’s 
protection in the first place. On the utilitarian account, that protection is merely a 
means to an end: by incentivizing expression, copyrights serve aggregate welfare. 
Drassinower wants to invoke the idea of moral autonomy that underpins Kant’s 
ethical theory to argue for an opposed understanding of authors’ rights as ends in 
themselves, “inseparable from and embedded in any affirmation of the dignity of 
authorship itself.”135 Yet what his analysis actually suggests is that authors’ rights are 
grounded, not in an idea of autonomy (whether Kantian or Millian) but in a quite 
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different idea of negative liberty: freedom as individual capacity to do (or in this case, 
to say) what one chooses, without interference from others but within limits defined 
by the equivalent liberties of others. Unfortunately, this presupposes an individualistic 
and empiricist understanding of the rationality of choice that is perfectly compatible 
with the very utilitarianism from which Drassinower seeks to distance himself.  
 
Kant’s own answer to the question of why individual expressivity merits protection is, 
as we have seen, rather more complex. At no point does he argue that individual 
rights to freedom of expression, much less authors’ rights, are directly deducible from 
the idea of moral autonomy. Individual expressive freedom is an aspect of a person’s 
agency, and Right requires that others not be permitted to interfere with or usurp it 
except under a universal law guaranteeing equal spheres of freedom for all. However 
there is much more at stake in the protection of expressive freedom than individual 
agency, because freedom of expression is also a condition for the possibility of 
intellectual autonomy in Kant’s very demanding sense: the determination of thought 
by reason alone. Intellectual autonomy in turn presupposes communicative freedom: 
the freedom to articulate one’s thoughts in public, subject to principles entailed by the 
internal logic of communication itself as a mode of interaction between a plurality of 
(at least potentially) rational persons. It is this principled freedom of thought and 
communication that alone serves humanity’s collective project of advancing towards a 
mature, and therefore fully emancipated, culture.  
 
What additional implications for copyright law – beyond those rightly identified by 
Drassinower – can be gleaned from Kant’s reflections on authors’ rights, set against 
this picture of communicative freedom? One point must be made unequivocally. It 
follows from Kant’s own understanding of Right that law cannot prohibit ‘immature’ 
forms of expression: individual liberty to say what one chooses is, as we have seen, a 
condition of communicative freedom in the richer sense outlined in section 2 above. 
There can therefore be no question of, for example, reorganizing the copyright system 
so as to favour intellectual production that shows a particularly high degree of 
authorial independence – as if such a standard could be knowable in advance of the 
very interactions that enable its emergence. Kant’s thinking must be construed as 
tending in a different direction, and as yielding two general but nonetheless powerful 
insights. First, the 1785 Essay on unauthorized reprinting reflects Kant’s recognition 
that communication between speakers in modern conditions is inevitably channelled – 
by technologies and media of communication (print and books in Kant’s day; 
software and networks in ours), by commercial intermediaries (Prussian publishers in 
Kant’s context; global information and entertainment corporations in ours), and by 
institutional structures (book markets then; information markets generally now) – in 
ways that may shape the form and content of communication and so the nature of the 
communication community itself. The Essay can therefore be understood as 
thematizing these mediations and their propensity to enhance, but also perhaps to 
compromise, extant possibilities for mature communicative interactions; and as 
reflecting upon the legal framework that ought to regulate these mediations so as to 
realise their capacity to support such interactions and forestall their capacity to distort 
them.136 The second insight speaks directly to that aspect of the legal framework that 
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protects the rights of authors. It poses a challenge to the premise of the standard 
liberal perspective on the relationship between authors’ rights and a free culture: that 
marketable property rights in authors’ works, by protecting individual expression, 
serve as motors of progress towards a fully competitive marketplace of ideas. For 
Kant, by contrast, progress towards an enlightened culture can only be achieved 
through the critical intellectual activity that communication – the free use of reason in 
public – demands. This position affords a perspective from which to evaluate the 
expressive diversity that passes for freedom on the standard liberal account: for Kant, 
there simply is no freedom without the principled communicative interactions that the 
public use of reason presupposes. Expressive freedom is certainly a condition of this 
‘higher’ form of freedom, but in so far as the workings of the copyright system 
impede the social practices and orientations conducive to intellectual/communicative 
autonomy, copyright law must be regarded as constituting an obstacle to cultural 
progress, rather than its engine.  
 
Constraints of space preclude a comprehensive exploration of the ways in which the 
current organization of the copyright industries and copyright law might be vulnerable 
to the kind of rethinking that these insights demand. However one conclusion at least 
seems inescapable: fully exchangeable property rights in works of authorship are in 
no way required by Kant’s theory of authors’ rights. IP scholars who claim Kant as an 
influence have been remarkably reluctant to acknowledge this,137 perhaps because of a 
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concern that without such rights authors would lack the means to support themselves 
from the fruits of their intellectual activity alone. Yet breaking the link between 
authors’ rights and property rights in no way entails leaving authors with only their 
inalienable ‘moral’ rights – their authorial ‘dignity’ and nothing else. As we have 
seen, Kant’s Essay was centrally oriented towards establishing the right of authors to 
earn a living from their works, thereby fostering the emergence of a class of 
professional intellectuals released from dependence on courtly and ecclesiastical 
patronage. In contemporary conditions, however, exchangeable intellectual property 
rights more often than not result in a new kind of authorial ‘tutelage’ in relation to the 
investors that acquire these rights.138 Reading Kant quite literally, there is no 
(rationally) necessary connection between protecting the material interests of authors 
and recognizing them as holders of property rights in their works, and it follows that 
other systems of subsidy might serve equally well to protect these interests while also 
more effectively guaranteeing authorial independence.139 As Kant himself pointed 
out, “the author speaks to his reader; and the one who has printed the book speaks, by 
his copy, not for himself but simply and solely in the author’s name. He presents the 
author as speaking publicly, and only mediates delivery of his speech to the 
public.”140 Ideally, then, commercial intermediaries between authors and audiences 
provide only “the mute instruments for delivering the author’s speech to the 
public;”141 they cannot assume the capacity to dictate or distort this speech.  
 
This dimension of Kant’s thought might fruitfully be read in relation to Jürgen 
Habermas’s much-discussed account of the ‘structural transformation’ of the public 
sphere.142 Habermas here picked out the rise of the culture industry in the nineteenth 
century as the key element in this transformation (and, in his view, decline). He 
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argued that commodified mass culture turned active readers into passive, privatized 
consumers of leisure and entertainment, fragmenting them into distinct taste 
communities and distancing them from cultural producers; while groups of experts 
emerged to take over the critical functions of the earlier public sphere. “The sounding 
board of an educated stratum tutored in the public use of reason … shattered; the 
public … split apart into minorities of specialists who put their reason to use 
nonpublicly and the great mass of consumers whose receptiveness [was] public but 
uncritical.”143 As a result, the eighteenth century public sphere – having initially 
emerged in opposition to the ‘representative’ public organised around the figure of the 
feudal monarch’s court – became ‘re-feudalised’. Habermas never considered how 
copyright law figured in this transformation, although an echo of his concerns 
arguably reverberates within contemporary debates about the ‘information feudalism’ 
associated with over-broad copyrights wielded in today’s context of cultural industry 
concentration.144 Reading Habermas in the light of Kant’s 1785 Essay, it seems clear 
that an analysis of the role that authors’ rights – as distinct from copyrights – might 
play in the reinvigoration of the public sphere (the sphere of principled public 
criticism) is long overdue.  
 
Such a project, however, would inevitably also involve reading Kant in the light of 
Habermas and other contemporary critics of information capitalism, and thus move 
beyond Kant’s own writings on authorship, rights and communicative freedom even if 
remaining broadly ‘Kantian’ in orientation. The justification for such a move would 
simply be this: in allowing one’s thinking about matters of contemporary concern to 
be guided by Kant’s texts, it is unwise to look in these texts for prescriptions that must 
be followed to the letter, for that would be to treat Kant himself as a ‘guardian’ whose 
doctrines ought to supplant our own intellectual autonomy in these matters. As is 
particularly apparent from his account of citizenship, Kant could not transcend his 
own – far from fully enlightened – cultural environment. It is for this reason that 
Habermas has read Kant’s remarks on publicity as presupposing the educated 
bourgeoisie as the critically debating public that was uniquely entitled and obliged to 
engage in a free use of its reason. And although Katerina Deligiorgi may be correct to 
claim that Kant’s exclusion of women from the status of citizenship did not translate 
into a denial of women’s participation in the cosmopolitan realm of public debate,145 
this concession arguably only reflects the division of the political from the 
(feminized) literary public sphere that was a feature of eighteenth century bourgeois 
life.146 Recall that Kant defines the public use of reason as “that use which anyone 
may make of [reason] as a scholar before the entire public of the world of readers.”147 
The words ‘anyone’ and ‘entire’ here suggest that this practice of reasoned 
communication is in principle available to all, regardless of social status. Yet the 
words ‘scholar’ and ‘readers’ make clear that it was from the ranks of the learned that 
Kant expected the rational debating public to emerge.148  
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If indeed Kant conflated the educated bourgeoisie with humanity as such, and saw the 
opinions generated by the debating bourgeois public as reflecting the light of reason 
as such, are we to assume that the authors whose rights Kant theorizes in his 
reflections on books and publishing are likewise bourgeois authors – if not ‘scholars’ 
then persons whose class position made it inevitable that they could write as if they 
were scholars? If so, Kant’s writings on both publicity and publishing would be 
hopelessly compromised by his own particular prejudices. Yet Habermas’s reading of 
Kantian publicity suggests that it need not be dismissed as a mere ideological cloak 
for bourgeois privilege: that the ideal of fully participatory public criticism between 
equals is still worth pursuing. The spirit of Kant’s understanding of this ideal – 
whereby ‘anyone’ may address the ‘entire public’ – requires that all persons be free, 
substantively as well as formally, to participate. Because of this, Kant’s argument for 
the continued advance of Enlightenment can be read as calling for the overcoming of 
every kind of obstacle to its realization – an unceasing interrogation of all the 
economic, technological, political, social and legal impediments that now stand in the 
way of universal, equal and effective access to the means and media of 
communication – and this on a global scale, if Kant is understood as positing a 
‘cosmopolitan’ society of free communicative interactions, a global public sphere. 
Copyright law is not the only such impediment – nor only an impediment, for as 
suggested here, authors’ rights deserve a place in the legal infrastructure underpinning 
both global and domestic public spheres – but in its current form it is an important 
one.  
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